Germany: lessons of the sell-out at Opel
19 October 2004

More than 50,000 workers took part in the international day of action against mass redundancies and cost cutting of half a billion Euros at General Motors Europe. Outside Europe, there were also solidarity strikes in three GM plants in Brazil.

A week before, the GM Management had announced its plan so lay off 12.000 workers in Europa. About 4000 to 4500 are to be sacked at each of the two major Opel plants in Germany, Rüsselsheim and Bochum. About 2000 jobs will go outside Germany (in Sweden, Britain, Belgium, Spain).

When the plans of the management were announced, the plant in Bochum reacted first, went on unofficial strike action and occupied the plant from 14 October onwards.

The reason for this was not only the announcement of the plan itself. In the weeks before the cuts were made public, the management in Bochum had ordered extra shifts to produce more components for other GM sites in Europe, in order to avoid the effects of strike action in Bochum. As it was revealed in the bourgeois press, the GM management had actually calculated for a two week long European strike.

What they had not foreseen was that the strike would start immediately and block the transportation of essential car components. That is why most European plants at GM ground to a halt at the beginning of last week.

This showed the strength of the workers in Bochum. One reason is that certain components for all European GM sites are produced there only. Thus a strike of several days at this plant brings the entire GM production in Europe to a halt. It is no accident, that this sector of Bochum shall be closed, if the management gets its plan through.

But the strike and occupation was limited to Bochum and - apart from the one day of action on 19 October - did not go beyond the town. The strike had obvious strong support in the Ruhr region and in the town Bochum in particular.

But it was not followed by any other plant either in Germany or beyond. Why? In all the other plants the works council (Betriebsrat) and the shop steward committees and via them the workers are lead by and under the control of the official works council and union leaderships. The works councils – which are themselves not union bodies - were (as in most cases) even more right wing than the union leaderships.

From the very beginning the chairman of the central works council, Franz, and the European works council were openly against the strike in Bochum, since this would "split the workers" (!) and make negotiations, by which they meant a . a sell out, more difficult. They denounced the demand of the workers in Bochum to fight against all redundancies as "utopian".

This was backed by the IG Metall central leadership - both by the right wing, which is strongly linked with works council leaders like Franz as well as by the "traditionalists" around IG Metall chairman Peters.

In addition also the SPD leaders came out with a similar position. They "understand" the workers concerns - but now they must go back to the negotiation table.

The bureaucrats played the following card: they suggested that either there would be a strike or negotiations. This came out in the ballot on Bochum on 20. October. The workers were asked by the works council whether they wanted to continue the action or negotiations should be started. This manipulative question led to a majority of 4700 against 1650 to resume work and thus ended the strike.

This makes a defeat of the GM workers likely. But why did the ballot lead to such a result.

Firstly, it was the lack of solidarity action outside Bochum. Even the "European day of action" was effectively a symbolic exercise.

Secondly and related to this, was the fear of many workers that a fighting workforce in Bochum would be sold out completely at the negations table by leaders like Franz.

Thirdly, it showed also the political weaknesses of the militant shop steward activists in Bochum and their isolation in this one plant.

The strike in Bochum was not simply "spontaneous". It was the result of a long political tradition and struggle in this plant. From the 1970s on, Opel Bochum was a stronghold of oppositional factory groupings, originally led by Maoists. Whilst there are hardly any Maoists left amongst the workers, there exists a quite lively and fighting shop steward committee, including a number of currents who are all more or less left or even subjectively revolutionary syndicalists. They (and the workers in Antwerp) had also organised the strikes in 2002 to force GM to guarantee jobs when it took over FIAT in Italy. They had unanimously opted to organise a stoppage from the very beginning.

Their strength of support can be seen in the 1650 who voted for continuation of the strike action. These were the votes of the active, most militant workers in the plant.

But the weakness could be seen that in the end of the day. The shop stewards and militant workers were not able to break the works councils and IG Metall leaderships control in the other plants and over the negotiations (albeit the shop stewards raised another of correct demands in that direction like "open negotiations", balloting of workers about any deal, electing and accountability of negotiators).

The ballot in Bochum means that it will be very difficult to shift around the course of theses negotiations, if they don't break down in themselves (which is unlikely).

But whatever the outcome they will only be the run up another round of rationalisation in the car industry (and in most other industries). Therefore, the shop stewards in Bochum (and others who have been in similar conditions like in DaimlerChrysler) will have to take the initiative for a national shop steward/rand and file conference to reach beyond Bochum and GM and to take the initiative to set up a national rank and file movement independent of all wings of the bureaucracy which can set out to achieve what was necessary at GM: to replace the entire union and works council leaderships by a class struggling rand and file movement.

But this also will necessitate that the shop stewards in Bochum break with a political weakness they have inherited from the past: left syndicalism. In order to really be able to build and politically lead a national rank and file movement, the workers also have to address the questions of building a new party of the working class, that will wage the class struggle to the end, that will see it as its duty to mobilise the maximum active support for any and every section of workers, like those in Bochum. The transcontinental operations of GM and its attacks on its workers show another thing: that such a party must be an international party too.