Bolivia: after the referendum, what next?
30 August 2004

Bolivia is one of the poorest countries in Latin America. It has an external debt of $6 billion and most Bolivians survive on a monthly income of less than $200 (about £120). No wonder then that the Bolivian people are demanding that their recently discovered $70 billion worth of natural gas reserves are used to improve their standard of living. But the imperialists, the oil and energy corporations and the ruling class of Bolivia have other plans. If they get their way, not one new school, hospital or road will be built from the wealth generated by the gas reserves.

After the discovery of the reserves in 1996, the government of the day, led by President Sanchez de Lozada (Goni), signed a deal whereby a number of multinational corporations would extract and export the gas via a pipeline that would pass through Chile, before it then to be shipped out to the US and Mexico. This was legislated for in the Hydrocarbons Law (No. 1689).

The Bolivian people were told this was the only way that these natural resources could be exploited. Bolivia would stand to gain an annual income of around $500 million, about enough to pay off its external debt every year. The generosity of the imperialists knows no bounds!

The Bolivian people decided to mobilise against this sell off of their assets. They demanded the nationalisation of the gas so that the wealth could be used for the benefit of ordinary Bolivians. They had seen a decade of privatisation and deregulation deliver nothing but poverty. In 2000, militant actions by workers and peasants had defeated the government over water privatisation in Cochabamba.

When the plan to sell off the gas became known, the organisations of the workers and peasants resolved to mobilise against it too. In October last year there was a national revolt. The COB (the main trade union federation) called a general strike. The peasants and their union the CSUTCB blockaded the roads. The country was paralysed. The government tried to use repression to defeat the movement. The army and the police killed over 80 people. But this could not crush the resistance.

In El Alto, a city of one million just outside the capital La Paz, the workers and unemployed organised local assemblies and elected delegates to a co-ordinating body, the FEJUVE. The unions in the COB also sent representatives to the FEJUVE. It became an alternative power to the city administration. When the government tried to restore control in El Alto, using police and troops, the FEJUVE responded by instructing its members to form Armed Self-Defence Brigades. The resolution stated that the "Brigades will be composed of volunteers and they will make Molotov bombs and explosive bombs".

There was increasing dissatisfaction among the conscript troops, sent in and ordered to fire on unarmed demonstrators. The striking miners marched on La Paz armed with sticks of dynamite. Army tanks blocked their path. The army officers, unsure that the rank and file troops would obey orders, were forced to let the miners through. The demonstrations in La Paz grew. After a number of days, with unrest increasing throughout the country, President Goni was forced to resign and flee the country. The Bolivian ruling class feared that, if Goni did not go, then there would have been a revolution - and they were right!

The October revolt should and could have led to the workers and peasants of Bolivia taking power but their leadership proved unable to take advantage of the revolutionary situation. Alternative organs of power like the FEJUVE in El Alto were beginning to appear all over the country. The peasants were occupying the land and the workers taking control of the factories and mines.

A revolutionary communist leadership, organised in a revolutionary party, would have pressed home the advantage. It would have called for the deepening and extension of the workers' and peasants' newly founded organisations - developed them into real soviet-type councils. These councils would have been the foundation of a revolutionary workers' and peasants' government. The armed self-defence brigades could have been developed and built into a real workers' militia to replace the army and police. When these organisations were strong enough, a revolutionary party would have led an insurrection to seize power from the ruling class and place it in the hands of the workers' organisations.

But the leaders of the COB and the CSUTCB did not push forward; rather they dissipated the movement and allowed the Bolivian rulers and their imperialist masters to regroup. The ruling class just replaced Goni and Carlos Mesa was made the new president. Mesa attempted to defuse the struggle over gas by declaring that a referendum would be held on the gas sell off and a new constituent assembly would be convened. Mesa even talked about bringing to justice those politicians and army officers responsible for the massacres at El Alto during the revolt.

He met the leaders of the COB and, while making no promises, said he had listened to their concerns. The COB leadership agreed to give conditional support to the new government, called off the general strike and blockades, and agreed to a 90-day truce to allow the new government to act. But from the start the new Mesa government was only formed to demobilise the mass movement and prepare a strategy to allow for the eventual sell off of the natural gas, one way or another.

Despite the fact that the majority of the population of Bolivia were against the privatisation of the gas, Mesa was busy preparing for the continuation of the sell off plans. In July a referendum was held with no less than five questions (see box) to allow the Mesa government to continue a policy of selling off the gas via the multinationals. The referendum was a trick, its aim to give legitimacy to the government's policy and to divide and weaken the opposition to it.

All the questions were posed to make it appear the government would increase the control over the extraction and export of the gas. But none of this will mean anything: Mesa has already confirmed that all existing contracts with the energy corporations will be honoured.

The workers' and peasants' organisations demanded that a simple question be put for the nationalisation of the gas reserves and production. Mesa refused to do this. As a result the COB and CSUTCB, along with other indigenous and peasant organisations called for a boycott of the referendum. But the boycott was not successful. The majority response to all five questions was "yes". The overall abstention rate was around 40 per cent - despite voting being compulsory, with fines for staying at home. Of those who voted, between 20 and 28 per cent for each question handed in either blank votes or spoilt ballot papers. But Mesa and the media declared the referendum a victory on the basis that a majority had participated in the referendum and a majority said yes.

The weakness of the campaign was due to two main reasons; firstly, the treacherous policy of Evo Morales, indigenous leader of the Movement Towards Socialism (MAS). Morales was a leading figure in the opposition to Goni. Now he called for people to vote on the first three questions.

Morales argued that if these three questions were approved it would allow the congress to pass legislation to nationalise the gas. Morales knew this would not happen and argued that compensation be paid to the corporations affected. Otherwise, he claimed demagogically, "it would be declaring war against the rest of the world".

Morales and the MAS have been important pillars of support for the Mesa government. At every turn since October last year, Morales has undermined direct action against the government and has continued to give it critical support in congress. Two weeks before the referendum, Morales was expelled from the COB as a "traitor".

The defeat was also due to confusion and division amongst the more militant opposition. Some organisations called for people not to vote at all and organised actions to physically stop the referendum from going ahead; others called for people to spoil their ballot by writing "nationalisation" across their papers. Peasants in the Santa Cruz region occupied gas installations and disrupted gas supplies by literally turning off the taps. In El Alto there was a civic strike during the referendum days.

Bolivia's rulers, on the other hand, were completely united. The government ensured the full use of its repressive forces with the army and police mobilised in all the key regions of the country. The Mesa government poured $800,000 into the Yes campaign. All of the establishment was lined up to back the referendum: the neoliberal political parties (MNR, MIR, NFR), the Catholic Church, Evo Morales and the MAS, the Permanent Human Rights Assembly, the Human Rights' Ombudsman's Office. Numerous NGOs equated participation in the referendum with support for direct democracy. The IMF made a $120 million loan contingent on a yes vote in the referendum, while President Lula of Brazil declared his support for a yes vote.

Despite the spin the referendum result is not a clear vindication of Mesa's policy and neither is the struggle over. In La Paz, El Alto and Cochabamba there have been demonstrations organised around the umbrella campaign National Co-ordination in Defence of Gas and Hydrocarbons, demanding the freezing of gas and oil prices and the nationalisation of gas and oil. There are mass assemblies and strikes taking place in many cities. A national transport strike is paralysing parts of the country and the peasants, in particular the cocaleros (coca growers regularly attacked by US trained special forces), have started to blockade the highways again. Mesa might have won the referendum but he has yet to secure the sell off.

Now read: Bolivia: workers and peasants must take the power (October 2003).